University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy

Philosophy, Department of

2004

A defense of the causal efficacy of dispositions
Jennifer McKitrick
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, jmckitrick2@unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosfacpub
McKitrick, Jennifer, "A defense of the causal efficacy of dispositions" (2004). Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy. 32.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosfacpub/32

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln.

A defense of the causal efficacy of
dispositions
Jennifer McKitrick

I. Introduction
Disposition terms, such as 'cowardice,' 'fragility' and 'reactivity,' often appear
in explanations. Sometimes we explain why a man ran away by saying that he
was cowardly, or we explain why something broke by saying it was fragile.
Scientific explanations of certain phenomena feature dispositional properties
like instability, reactivity, and conductivity. And these look like causal
explanations - they seem to provide information about the causal history of
various events.
Philosophers such as Ned Block, Jaegwon Kim, Elizabeth Prior, Robert
Pargetter, and Frank Jackson l have suggested reasons for thinking that
dispositions are causally inert. I call this the "Inert Dispositions View."
According to this view, the glass's fragility was not responsible for its breaking;
the man's cowardice was causally impotent as he fled. The Inert Dispositions
View would call many of the explanations we give into question. By employing
a disposition in an explanation, we might have thought we were giving a causal
explanation of the event. Perhaps we took ourselves to be explaining an effect
with some feature of its cause that was responsible for the effect. However, if
dispositions are causally inert, we are explaining the event in some other way,
or not really explaining it at all.
The Inert Dispositions View suggests that something is amiss with many
scientific explanations. If properties like conductivity and volatility are causally
inert, it is not clear how appealing to them provides us with information about
why certain phenomena occur. This is especially problematic if one thinks, as
some do, that the fundamental properties that scientists attribute to the ultimate
1 Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, 'Three Theses About Dispositions'. American Philosophical
Quarterly, 19 (1982): 251-257; Frank Jackson, 'Mental Causation', Mind, 105 (1996): 377-413;
'Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation', Proceedings o/the Aristotelian-Society, 95
(1995): 253-268; Ned Block, 'Can the Mind Change the World?', in Meaning and Method:
Essays in Honoro/Hilary Putnam (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); JaegwonKim,
'Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion', 'The Nonreductivist's Troubles With Mental
Causation' in Supervenience and Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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constituents of matter - things like force, mass, charge, impenetrability - are
dispositional. If, as Simon Blackburn says, "science finds only dispositional
properties all the way down,"2 and if dispositions are causally inert, it would
seem that science does not provide us with real causal explanations.
The Inert Dispositions View implies that there is something amiss with
psychological explanations as well. At least some psychological states are
dispositional - being courageous or shy, being such that you would accept
a drink if you were offered one. On some views, all mental states are like
dispositions, since having a mental state is a matter of having some brain state
or other that performs a certain causal role. If mental properties are relevantly
similar to dispositions, and dispositions are inert, then mental properties make
no difference to what a body does. However, it is natural to think that my
believing and desiring certain things has much to do with my body moving
in certain ways. It would take powerful arguments to cast these beliefs into
serious doubt.
In this paper, I defend the causal efficacy of dispositions against two types
of arguments thatl call "Analyticity Arguments" and "No Work Arguments."
According to Analyticity Arguments, there is an analytic or necessary
connection between a disposition and its manifestation, and this goes to show
that there is no causal connection. I argue, on the contrary, that it shows no
such thing. According to No Work arguments, manifestations of dispositions
already have sufficient causes, and so there is "no work" for dispositions to do.
I claim that these arguments rest on some questionable assumptions.

II. Dispositions
Proponents of the Inert Dispositions View assume a certain view of dispositions
that I will adopt for purposes of this paper. A disposition is a property that
several objects can have in common. (For example, all the glasses in my
cupboard are fragile, or have fragility.) A disposition can be given a secondorder characterization - a disposition is a property of having some property
which plays a certain causal role. (A thing is fragile if it has some property
which makes it such that it will break when struck.) Every disposition has a
causal basis - a property that is causally efficacious for the manifestation, given
the circumstances. 3 (Glass has a particular sort of molecular bonding which is
causally efficacious for breaking upon striking.) In sum:
2 Simon Blackburn, 'Filling in Space'.

Analysis, 50 (1990): 255.

3 As I have argued elsewhere, it is possible that there are "bare dispositions" that have no causal

bases (Jennifer McKitrick, 'The Bare Metaphysical Possibility ofBare Dispositions'. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXVI No.2 (2003): 349-369). However, for the sake
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To have disposition D to give manifestation M in circumstances C is to
have some property P which is a causal basis for giving M in C.

and
To have a causal basis for giving M in C is to have a property that is
causally efficacious for Min C.
Typically, dispositions are multiply realizable. (The causal basis of fragility
might be one thing in glass, and another in eggshells.) Also, for all that has
been said, a particular instance of a disposition can have more than one causal
basis. (If a glass had two properties, either of which would be efficacious for
breaking when struck, then both are causal bases of the glass's fragility.)

III. Causa I Efficacy
Presumably, those who think that dispositions are "inert," "impotent," "causally
irrelevant," and "inefficacious" believe nonetheless that some properties do
not suffer from this inadequacy. It is thought that some non-dispositional
properties have some relation to effects which dispositions lack. This relation
is characterized in various ways: certain properties make a difference to what
happens; they explain effects; an event caused what it did "in virtue of'
instantiating certain properties; they are the causally efficacious properties. For
example, the surprise party's being sudden and unexpected was efficacious for
surprising me, but its lasting five hours was irrelevant to my being surprised.
Causal efficacy is a relation between some of the properties of an event
and an effect of that event. However, it is also said that properties of objects
are causally efficacious. For example, if a ball was thrown at a window and
broke the glass pane, the mass and velocity of the ball was efficacious for the
breaking, but the color of the ball, and its belonging to little Johnny are not
relevant. I could recast this talk in terms of properties of events, such as the
property being a throwing of a ball with a particular mass. 4 However, such
locutions are awkward. For convenience, I call all the properties of an event,
together with the properties of the objects involved in that event, the "eventproperties."
Though it is a matter of significant controversy, when philosophers talk
about causal efficacy, they seem to have something like the following in
mind: a causally efficacious property is a member of a set of properties which
of this paper, I am granting that all dispositions have causal bases.
similar point is made by David Braun, 'Causally Relevant Properties'. Philosophical Perspectives, 9 (1995): 449.
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is minimally sufficient for the occurrence of an effect. Given a set of eventproperties, some subset of properties is causally efficacious for an effect of
that event. These properties are such that, when instantiated together in this
fashion, the effect necessarily occurs (or if the world is indeterministic, the
effect has a certain probability of occurring). This set of causally efficacious
properties is to be minimal, in that no subset of it would be sufficient for the
occurrence of the effect. In sum:
If a property P is causally efficacious for an event e, then

P is a member of a set of event-properties S which is:
i) sufficient, given the laws, for e; and
ii) such that no proper subset of S has this feature.
This definition is probably incomplete as it stands. One might add such
qualifications as: there are no inhibiting factors present, or the properties in
S are natural properties. Despite the likely need for further qualifications,
this definition helps to flesh out the intuitive idea of causal efficacy that is at
work in the arguments to follow. However, note that this definition does not
guarantee that a minimally sufficient set of properties will be unique. The
mere definition of "causal efficacy" does not rule out the possibility of one
event instantiating two sets of properties, each of which would be minimally
sufficient for a certain effect.
We can now put the Inert Dispositions View more precisely: No disposition is
a member of a minimal set of properties which is sufficient for the occurrence
of the manifestation ofthat disposition. Now let's consider the arguments which
are supposed to convince us that the Inert Dispositions View is correct.

III. Analyticity Arguments
According to an Analyticity Argument, there is an analytic relation between a
disposition and a manifestation, and therefore, there is no causal connection
between them. Any adequate definition of a disposition will refer to its
characteristic manifestation. For example, "fragility" is defined by reference
to breaking or shattering. So, there is a definitional or conceptual connection
between a disposition term and an event-type - between 'fragility' and breaking,
for example. "Fragile objects tend to break when struck" is, in some sense,
analytic. It is further assumed that causal claims are contingent, and not
analytic. It follows that, if a statement is analytic, it is not a causal statement.
Consequently, "The glass broke because it was fragile" cannot be a causal
claim, and so fragility must be causally inert.
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Analyticity arguments have long been disputed. As Donald Davidson points
out, how events are described, what names they are given, neither determines
nor precludes causal connections between them .
.. .there is something very odd in the idea that causal relations are
empirical rather than logical. What can this mean? Surely not that
every true causal statement is empirical. For suppose 'A caused B' is
true. Then the cause ofB = A; so substituting, we have 'The cause of
B caused B' , which is analytic. The truth of a causal statement depends
on what events are described; its status as analytic or synthetic depends
on how the events are described. 5
Causal connections between events hold independently of our descriptions of
them. The same can be said of properties. A property can be picked out via its
efficacy for some effect. Consider the claim "The property that was causally
efficacious for e was causally efficacious for e." The statement is analytic, but
that should not lead us to think that the property that was causally efficacious
for e was not causally efficacious for e!
However, these observations have not put an end to Analyticity Arguments.
According to a more modest Analyticity Argument, our sense that the disposition
is relevant to the manifestation is explained by the analytic connection, and
this leaves us with no reason to suppose a causal connection holds. Absent a
reason to suppose a causal connection holds, presumably we should assume
one is absent. This is what Block suggests when he writes:
The fact that dormitivity is sufficient for sleep is perfectly intelligible in
terms of this logical relation. What reason is there to suppose that there
must also be a nomological relation between dormitivity and sleep?6
Block's rhetorical question suggests that there is no reason to suppose there is a
causal connection between dormitivity and sleep, in addition to the logical one.
The logical, or analytic relation between 'dormitivity' and 'sleep' fully explains
(i.e. renders "perfectly intelligible") the fact that donnitivity is sufficient for
sleep. Since we have a full explanation, we need not, and indeed should not, look
any further. (Interestingly, this analyticity argument appeals to some principle
of explanatory exclusion, which will be discussed at length later.)
In response, pointing out one reason that something is relevant does not
show that that is the only reason. Donnitivity might be relevant to sleep both

5

6

Donald Davidson: Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 14.
Block, 'Can the Mind Change the World?', p. 157.
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conceptually and causally. We have additional reasons for supposing that causal
connections hold between dispositions and events, especially when we think
about mental properties as dispositions. Even if our language and explanatory
practices did not give us reasons for supposing that there is a causal connection
between dormitivity and sleep, there might nevertheless be one. Furthermore,
our language and explanatory practices do give us reasons to suppose causal
connections exist. Our descriptions of events seem to track causal connections.
Examples of this are familiar: sunburn is caused by excessive exposure to
sunlight; lethal injections and fatal accidents cause death. The existence of
conceptual connections between our descriptions of events seems to support
the idea that these events are causally connected. A similar point can be made
about predicates tracking causally relevant properties.

IV. Hume's Principle
One might still be troubled by the thought that the connection between a
disposition and its manifestation is too "tight" for there to be a causal relation as
well. Frank Jackson claims that there is a metaphysically necessary connection
between a disposition and its manifestation that is incompatible with a causal
connection. According to Jackson, saying that fragility causes glass to break
is to violate Hume's Principle about the contingency of causal connections. 7
According to Jackson, a thing's causal powers are accidental properties, which
depend on what world it is in, and which laws obtain. So, if two states have a
necessary connection, they cannot be causally connected as well. According
to Jackson, to allow that fragility causes breaking upon dropping would be to allow that there are properties that have causal powers
essentially: in every world the property of having the property or
properties responsible for breaking on dropping in that world is
possessed only by objects which are such that were they dropped they
would break. There is no way that the second-order property can be
instantiated without the relevant causal power being instantiated. So,
if we are to respect Hume's insight, we must deny that fragility itself
does the causing of the breaking ... 8
The key premise of Jackson's argument is what he calls Hume's Principle,
which can be put as follows:

Jackson, 'Essentialism... ', p. 257.
8 Jackson, 'Essentialism ... ', p. 257.

7
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If events with event-property P cause events of kind K, they do so contingently; there is a possible world in which P-events occur, but do not
cause K-events.

While Jackson doesn't provide an argument for this premise, perhaps it is
supposed to be intuitively plausible. But is it? Consider the property of being
negatively charged. If negative charge is causally efficacious for repelling
negatively charged particles, according to Hume's Principle, this should be
a contingent fact about negative charge - there should be a possible world
in which a thing has negative charge, but is not disposed to repel negatively
charged particles. Accordingly, there would be a possible world in which
negatively charged particles come close to each other, but are not repelled,
other things being equal. It is not at all obvious that such a world is possible
- it seems inconsistent with the meaning of "negatively charged." On the other
hand, Jackson might say that negative charge is inert with respect to repelling
negatively charged particles. That option also strikes me as counter-intuitive.
Negative charge seems to be both conceptually and causally connected to the
repulsion of negatively charged particles.
It is worth noting that Hume's Principle is hardly common ground among
philosophers. Robert Stalnaker, for example, claims that there are certain
properties, such as mass, charge, or impenetrability, that cannot be "separated,
conceptually, from the laws in which they occur and from the causal powers
they confer on objects that instantiate them.,,9 On Sydney Shoemaker's view,
what determines the identity of a property "is its potential for contributing to
the causal powers of things that have it. "10 According to Shoemaker, every
property has its causal powers essentially. So, if we decline to "respect Hume's
insight," we are not alone.
In sum, neither the straightforward Analyticity Argument, nor Jackson's
appeal to Hume's Principle, succeed in showing that dispositions are causally
inert. Now, let's tum to a different argumentative strategy of the Inert
Dispositions View - the No Work Argument.

v. The No Work Argument
No Work Arguments are familiar in the literature on mental causation. Consider

9 Robert

Stalnaker, Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), p. 160.
Shoemaker, 'Causality and Properties', in Time and Cause, ed. P. van Inwagen (Dordecht:
Reidel, 1980), pp. 109-35.
10
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mental property M and physical property P, which are candidates for being
causally efficacious with respect to a brain event with mental property M* and
physical property P*. Kim argues that M has no causal powers of its own:
P is doing all the causal work, and M's causation ofP*, or ofM* turns
out to be derivative from P's causal powers. Thus, M has no causal
powers over and beyond those of P ... II
Regarding the causal efficacy of semantic properties, Block writes:
It seems that our cognitive processes exploit a correlation between
the semantic and the syntactic. The syntactic properties of the
representation do the causal work, and the semantic properties come
along for the ride. 12

Similarly, Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson (hereafter PPJ) support the Inert
Dispositions View with a No Work argument. They write that since the causal
basis and the circumstances of manifestation are sufficient for the manifestation,
"there is nothing left for any other properties of the object to dO.,,13
The relevant similarity among mental properties, semantic properties, and
dispositions is that they are all, on these accounts, second-order properties.
The base (or realizer) properties are causally efficacious for a certain event,
and this excludes the second-order property from being causally efficacious as
well. The circumstances of manifestation and the base properties are sufficient
for the manifestation, and unless there's overdetermination, all other properties
are inert.
PPJ's argument from "Three Theses about Dispositions" is typical of No
Work arguments. 14 It can be summarized as follows:
1) Every disposition has a causal basis.
2) The Distinctness Thesis: Causal bases are distinct from their attendant
dispositions.
3) Given the circumstances of manifestation, a causal basis is sufficient
for the manifestation of the disposition.
4) The Exclusion Principle: If the instantiation of a set of properties is
sufficient to bring about a certain effect, then all other properties are

II

Kim, 'Nonreductivist Troubles with Mental Causation'. Supervenience and Mind, p. 353.

12 Block, 'Can the Mind Change the World', p. 145.
13 PPJ, 'Three Theses About Dispositions', p. 255.
14

PPJ, 'Three Theses About Dispositions', p. 255.
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causally inefficacious with respect to that effect.
Therefore,
5) Dispositions are causally inefficacious.
I grant premise (1) since it follows from our working definition of"disposition. ,,15
I also grant premise (3) for the sake of argument. 16 This leaves two principle
ways of attacking the No Work argument - by denying The Distinctness Thesis
(premise 2), or by denying The Exclusion Principle (premise 4). First, I will
consider denying The Distinctness Thesis, and raise some difficulties for
that approach. I then pursue my favored strategy, challenging The Exclusion
Principle.

VI. Denying Distinctness
According to the Distinctness Thesis, a disposition is distinct from its causal
basis. To deny this thesis is to identify a disposition with its causal basis. This
would solve the problem of "dispositional causation" and refute the Inert
Dispositions View. If the causal basis is causally efficacious, and the disposition
is the causal basis, then the disposition is causally efficacious. 17
The fact that dispositions can be multiply realized poses a difficulty for this
approach. A disposition can have different causal bases in different objects.
Crystal, porcelain, and egg shells are all fragile, and presumably they have
different micro-structural properties that account for this. So, it seems that
you cannot identify a disposition with its causal basis in every instance. For
example, you cannot say both that fragility is identical to molecular bonding
P and that fragility is identical to crystalline structure Q, because P and Q are
distinct.

15 Recall: x has disposition D to give manifestation M in circumstances C iff x has some property
P which is a causal basis for giving M in C.
16 PPJ define causal basis as the properties of the disposed object that would be sufficient for
the manifestation in the circumstances ('Three Theses About Dispositions', p. 251), and so
premise (3) follows. We could contest this way of defining "causal basis," but PPJ's argument
could be restated easily enough. (Consider a set of x's properties that are sufficient for M in
C. Call it S. etc.)
17 This may seem to be at odds with the second-order characterization of dispositions. If a disposition is a second-order property, how could it be identical to its first-order realizer? However,
I'm assuming that if a property P has the same extension as a property Q, then P and Q are the
same property. So, the property of having property P=property P, since they necessarily have
the same extension.
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VII. The Disjunctive Solution
One way to respond to this problem is to suggest that a disposition is identical
to a disjunction of its realizers. Consider a case where there are only two
realizers of fragility, P and Q. According to this Disjunctive Solution, being
fragile is identified with having (P v Q). The causal efficacy of fragility is just
that ofP or Q.
It may seem as though identifying a disposition with a disjunction of its causal
bases is not to deny the Distinctness Thesis at all. Even if a disposition is a
disjunction of its various causal bases, that is not to say that the disposition is
identical to any particular causal basis. So, if the causal basis of fragility were
P in some instances, and Q in others, even if fragility is identical to (P v Q), it
still wouldn't be identical to P, nor identical to Q.
However, perhaps a given instance of a disposition can have more than one
causal basis. A particular instance of fragility might have P as a causal basis,
and (P v Q) as another causal basis. The disjunction of various causal bases
could itself be a causal basis, and that causal basis would be identical to the
disposition, on this view.
Notice, however, that this approach to attacking the No Work Argument
will run afoul of the Exclusion Principle. It seems that there would be a set of
properties which included P, but excluded (P v Q) which would be sufficient
for breaking. IfP is responsible for the breaking, as far as the properties of the
glass are concerned, what is the role ofthe disjunctive property (P v Q)? If the
property (P v Q) were also causally efficacious, it would seem to overdetermine
the breaking. Ifwe accept the Exclusion Principle, we cannot say that both (P v
Q) and P are efficacious with respect to breaking. So, in order for the Disjunctive
Solution to succeed, it will have to be coupled with an argument against the
Exclusion Principle, such as the one I will offer in the next section.
There are other reasons for doubting the Disjunctive Solution, irrespective
of the Exclusion Principle. Disjunctive properties are suspect. Lewis says that
a disposition "unlike the various bases, is too disjunctive and too extrinsic to
occupy any causal role.,,18 Likewise, Kim says:
the first-order realizing properties are extremely diverse and
heterogeneous, so much so that their disjunctions cannot be considered
well-behaved properties with the kind of systematic unity required for
propertyhood. 19

18 Lewis, 'Causal Explanation', in Philosophical Papers. Volume 2. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press 1983), p. 224.
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If this is right, and dispositions are disjunctive properties, then the problem is
not that there is no causal work for dispositions to do once the base properties
do their job; it is that dispositions are not the kinds of properties that are capable
of doing any causal work at all.
Kim and Lewis seem to be claiming that a property such as (P v Q) cannot
be eligible for any causal or nomic role, simply by virtue of being a disjunctive
property. In order to assess these claims, we must clarify the nature of disjunctive
properties. Intuitively, if P is a property and Q is a property, the disjunction
ofP and Q will be a disjunctive property. But consider the case where P is the
property being a female cat, and Q is the property being a male cat. If all cats
are male or female, then being a female cat or a male cat is the same property
as being a cat, which does not seem like a disjunctive property. Being named
by a disjunctive predicate does not make a property disjunctive in the relevant
sense. (We could make up disjunctive names for any property, e.g., being blue
is being blue and square or being blue and not square.) To call a property
"disjunctive" is to say that the things which have this property do not form a
natural class. Disjunctive properties are unnatural properties.
The problem with drawing conclusions about properties from predicates
is that, in natural languages, the distinction between simple and disjunctive
predicates does not line up neatly with the distinction between natural and
unnatural properties. But imagine a language L. In L, all natural properties
are named by simple predicates. However, if a disjunctive predicate refers to
a property P in L, it wouldn't follow that P was unnatural. Possibly, a simple
predicate could also refer to P. One might think that this is impossible, because
the disjunction of two natural properties is always a less natural property.
However, this view is mistaken. Naturalness in not an all or nothing thing, but
rather a matter of degree. So, the disjunction of two properties might tum out
to be a more natural property, or at least natural enough to play some causal
role.
Even if dispositions can be characterized in disjunctive terms, they might
still be natural properties. If a disposition D is a property of having some
property or other that fills causal role R, even if D is multiply realizable, all
the properties that realize D will have at least one thing in common - they fill
causal role R. IfP and Q both realize D, they play the same causal role. Recall
that Shoemaker says that properties can be classified by their causal roles. In
a similar vein, Kim says:

19

Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press 1996), p. 117.
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kinds in science are individuated on the basis of causal powers;
that is, to be recognized as a useful property in a scientific theory, a
property must possess (or be) a determinate set of causal powers. To
put it another way, the resemblance that defines kinds in science is
primarily causal/nomological resemblance: Things that are similar in
causal powers and play similar roles in laws are classified as falling
under the same kind. 20
On such an account, P and Q would seem to be the same kind. If they are of
the same kind, their disjunction is not diverse and heterogeneous. Maybe P and
Q can play other causal roles, and this fact can serve to differentiate them. But
that does not show that they are of different kinds. Things of the same kind
need not be qualitatively identical in every respect.
Think of the role of alleviating pain in humans. There are a number of
chemicals that fill that role that have different constituents and different
structures. However, by filling that role, many of them are considered to be
of a kind - opiates. 2l For one reason or another, these various natural and
synthetic molecules bind to opiate receptors in the brain. The class of opiates
does not seem to be a heterogeneous, gerrymandered group. We are justified
in classifying them as the same kind because they have similar effects.
It is important to point out that disjunctive predicates can sometimes refer
to natural, causally efficacious properties. However, this approach to saving
the causal efficacy of dispositions has its limitations. While this approach may
work for some dispositions, like the disposition to relieve pain in humans, it
seems less plausible in other cases. Think of provocativeness - the disposition
to elicit an aggressive response. Something can elicit an aggressive response
in an animal, suppose, if it is a certain color, if it has a certain odor, or if it is
moving in a certain way. But it is hard to believe that a disjunctive property
like (being red or oscillating or smelling like blood) is a natural property that
is apt for figuring in causal laws.
One response is to say that some disposition terms refer to natural properties,
while others do not. Perhaps terms like' provocative' are merely terms we use

Kim, Philosophy of Mind, p. 119.
"The term 'opioid' has been adopted as a general classification of all of those agents that share
chemical structures, sites, and mechanisms of action with the endogenous opioid agonists. Opioid
substances encompass all of the natural and synthetic chemical compounds closely related to
morphine, whether they act as agonists or antagonists." (http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/
article/6/0,5716,1 08956+ 15+ 106187,00.html?query=opiates)
20
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to make causal generalizations about objects which are not intrinsically similar
in any relevant respect. But another disposition could be a natural property
if all of its realizer properties formed a natural class. By this strategy, one
would not support the causal efficacy of every property we have been calling
'dispositional,' but only the dispositions which are plausibly natural properties.
Perhaps there are other moves that the proponent of the Disjunctive Solution
could make, but if he takes this route, he winds up with a somewhat qualified
defense of the Efficacious Dispositions View. Without further investigation,
and without some guide as to how to determine the naturalness of a property,
it is not clear which dispositions would come out causally efficacious on this
approach. While others may pursue this strategy further, I will tum my attention
to a different response to the Distinctness Thesis.

VIII. The Trope Solution
Cynthia and Graham MacDonald, among others, appeal to the idea of tropes
in order to respond to the No Work Argument. 22 The view can be summarized
as follows. While the Distinctness Thesis applies at the level of properties,
understood as classes or universals, it does not apply at the level of property
instances, or tropes. So, a property instance of a disposition is identical to a
property instance of a base property. Furthermore, particular property instances
are causally efficacious for events. So, it is not a problem if fragility is not
causally efficacious for breaking, since particular havings of fragility are. Let
me explain in more detail.
Redness is something shared by all red things. The redness of the apple on
my desk is a particular instantiation of redness, also called a red trope. Suppose
that the apple is a particular shade of red, say russet. Red and russet stand in the
relation of determinable to determinate. Now, this apple's "russetness" bears a
relation to its redness that it does not bear to, say, its roundness. One might say

Graham and Cynthia MacDonald, 'Mental Causation and Explanation of Action', in Mind,
Causation and Action, ed. L Steveson, R. Squires and J. Haldane (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1986), p. 38. See also Douglas Ehring, 'Mental Causation, Determinables and Property Instances' .
No us , 30 (1996): 461-80. The target ofthis attack is epiphenomenalism about mental properties;
however, the same arguments can be applied to dispositions.
23 Incidentally, I do not share the intuition that the apple's redness is identical to its russetness.
I could pick the apple out of a barrel of crimson apples because of its russetness (not its redness). The apple might change its shade as it ripens, losing its russetness, but not its redness.
These considerations are perhaps not decisive, but further discussion of them would take us
too far afield.
22
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that the apple's redness is nothing "over and above" its russetness. Redness and
russetness are two different properties, having different extensions. However,
on this view, this apple's russetness is the same thing as its redness. Its red
trope is identical to its russet trope. 23 In the same way, it is thought, a particular
glass's fragility is the same thing as its crystalline structure. Its crystalline
structure is its particular way of being fragile, just as the apple's russetness
is its particular way of being red. This is to deny the Distinctness Thesis for
tropes - a disposition trope is not distinct from its causal basis trope.
A key to this strategy is the claim that causal efficacy is a relation between
a trope and an event, rather than a property and an event. Couple this with the
claim that one trope is an instance of a determinate and its determinables, and
this view is subject to a serious difficulty, which can be brought out by certain
counterexamples.
To adapt an example from Stephen Yablo,24 suppose you are shipping
packages, and you are constrained by a 20 pound weight limit. You have a
crude scale that will only tell you ifyour package is over 20 pounds. So, you put
a package on the scale which happens to weigh 21 pounds. The scale indicates
that the package is over the weight limit. Now, it seems that weighing 21 pounds
was causally efficacious for tipping the scale. Since tropes of determinables
are identical to tropes of their determinates, the package's weighing over 20
pounds is the same trope as its weighing 21 pounds. And since the package's
weighing 21 pounds was efficacious, and its weighing 21 pounds is identical
to its weighing over 20 pounds, its weighing over 20 pounds was causally
efficacious. So far, so good.
The problems arise when we note that weighing 21 pounds is also a
determinate of other determinables, such as weighing less than 30 pounds. It
follows that the package's weighing less than 30 pounds trope is also identical
to its weighing 21 pounds trope. By the transitivity of identity, the package's
weighing less than 30 pounds is identical to its weighing over 20 pounds.
Furthermore, it follows that the package's weighing less than 30 pounds was
causally efficacious for tipping the scale, as was its weighing an odd number
ofpounds. We can generate infinitely many causal efficacy claims along these
lines, most of them wildly counter-intuitive.
What's worse is that, on this view, we lose the sense that it is in virtue of
instantiating a certain property that an event has the effect that it does. Some
philosophers think that to be causally efficacious, a property must be apt to
24 Stephen Yablo, 'Mental Causation'. The Philosophical Review, 101 (1992): 259 (footnote
32).
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figure in causal laws. But tropes, being particulars, are not apt for this role, and
they provide us with no way of generalizing from a particular causal claim.
Assuming regularity of the laws, if an instance of a property was causally
efficacious for a certain effect in a certain circumstance, that should give
us some reason to think that an instance of the same property in a similar
circumstance will be similarly efficacious. However, if we are inclined to
think that a weighing less than 30 pounds trope was causally efficacious for
tipping the scale in a particular instance, we would be mistaken in concluding
that further instantiations of weighing less than 30 pounds will be causally
efficacious for tipping the scale. One might think that causal efficacy claims
should support counterfactuals, but if causal efficacy claims are claims about
tropes, they will not.
One might try to avoid these problematic implications in a couple of
ways. One way is to distinguish tropes of determinables from tropes of their
determinates. One would avoid saying that the package's weighing less than
30 pounds is identical to its weighing over 20 pounds. One would also avoid
having to say that weighing less than 30 pounds is causally efficacious for
tipping the scale. But one would avoid these problems at a significant cost.
Identifying tropes of determinables with tropes of determinates is a key part of
the Trope Solution. To distinguish them would be to embrace the Distinctness
Thesis for tropes. That would be to say that a disposition trope is distinct from
its causal basis trope. While this might be a plausible view for independent
reasons, it has no place in this challenge to the No Work argument.
Another approach is to say that the trope is causally efficacious in virtue of
being a trope of a particular property. So, the package's trope tips the scale
in virtue of being a trope of the property weighing over 20 pounds, but not in
virtue of being a trope of the property weighing less than 30 pounds. However,
now we are back to talking about properties, and our introduction of tropes
has not advanced our argument. For these reasons, I am inclined to stick with
thinking of properties, rather than tropes, as the relata of causal efficacy.
In sum, I have considered two approaches to denying the Distinctness Thesis,
the second premise of the No Work argument. One is the Disjunctive Solution,
according to which a disposition is identical to a disjunction of its realizers.
The other is the Trope Solution, according to which instances of a disposition
are identical to instances of its realizers. I think that both of these approaches
face difficulties, though perhaps they are not insurmountable. Now I turn my
attention to the fourth premise of the No Work argument - the Exclusion
Principle.
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IX. The Exclusion Principle
As we have seen, even if we deny the Distinctness Thesis via the Disjunctive
Solution, we still need to deny the Exclusion Principle. According to the
Exclusion Principle:
If the instantiation of a set of properties is sufficient to bring about a
certain effect, then all other properties are causally inefficacious with
respect to that effect.
Suppose a particular causal basis and the properties of the circumstances of
manifestation are sufficient for the manifestation. It would follow from the
Exclusion Principle that a disjunction of causal bases (i.e., the disposition,
according to the Disjunctive Solution) would be inert. If denying the
Distinctness Thesis requires the Disjunctive Solution and a denial of the
Exclusion Principle, but denying the Exclusion Principle is sufficient to defeat
the No Work argument, then we might as well go straight for the Exclusion
Principle. Even if we are inclined to accept the Distinctness Thesis, we can
still attack the No Work Argument by denying the Exclusion Principle.
Kim says:
The general principle of explanatory exclusion states that two or more
complete and independent explanations of the same phenomenon
cannot coexist. 25
PPJ succinctly echo "a complete causal explanation excludes competitors. "26
PPJ and Kim seem to be making a claim about explanation, which is not
obviously about properties. However, the Exclusion Principle is used to draw
conclusions about which properties are causally efficacious. I take it that this
principle has metaphysical import. The formulation I give above is stated
in terms of properties, and I assume it is at least a corollary of the principle
articulated by Kim and PPJ.
Proponents of the Exclusion Principle say that to deny it is to allow for
spurious over-determination. Denying the Exclusion Principle amounts to
saying that both the causal basis and the disposition are each sufficient for the
effect, given the circumstances of manifestation. If this happened every time
any disposition is manifest, we would have, as Block says, "bizarre, systematic
over-determination. "27

Kim, 'Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion', in Supervenience and Mind, p.
250.
26 'Three Theses About Dispositions', p. 225.
25
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Standardly, an event e is causally overdetennined if two or more distinct
events occur, each of which is sufficient to cause e. Admittedly, there is
something wrong with postulating too many coincidences. And if a great many
effects systematically had two distinct events that were sufficient for causing
them, that would run counter to our understanding of the causal structure of
the world. Maybe that would be too high a price to pay for saving the causal
efficacy of dispositions.
However, one should not overlook the fact that these considerations
and intuitions about overdetermination apply to two (or more) events
overdetennining an effect. But what we are concerned with in the case of
dispositions and causal bases are the properties ofa single event (or of a single
object involved in an event). But it is not clear what it means to sayan effect
is overdetennined by an object's properties. Perhaps it would be to say that
there are two different sets of properties, both of which are such that their
instantiations are sufficient for a certain type of effect.
Is this kind of "overdetennination" so worrisome? Most events instantiate a
huge number of properties, many of which bear logical or nomological relations
to one-another. A property is causally efficacious if it is a member of a set of
event-properties S that is minimally sufficient for a certain effect. But there
is no guarantee that, for any event, there is a unique set S. It seems that any
time an event is caused, the cause instantiates several sets of properties, each
of which is sufficient for the effect. One can "carve things up" in a number
of ways, depending on one's interests or purposes. Suppose redness were a
member of a set of properties that was sufficient for provoking a bull. It seems
that there would be another set of properties, that included crimson instead,
that would also be sufficient.
The Exclusion Principle asks us to single out one special set of eventproperties that are minimally sufficient for an effect, and declare the rest
causally inert. This may prove difficult to do, especially when properties are
so intimately related, as a disposition is to its causal basis. Furthennore, it is
not clear that we have any compelling reason to suppose that, for any effect,
there is only one minimally sufficient set of causally efficacious properties.
Imagine how the Exclusion Principle would work in practice. Let us make
the following suppositions:
An event occurs, which involves an object o.
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Block, 'Can the Mind Change the World?', p. 159.
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o has property F.
F is causally efficacious for some event e.
o has G, and G differs from F.
We are wondering whether G is causally efficacious for e. 0 's having one
property can necessitate or entail that it has another property. Suppose that
o's having F entails that 0 has G. It follows from the Exclusion Principle that
G is causally inert with respect to e. A set of properties which included F and
excluded G would be sufficient for e, and so a set of properties which included
both F and G would not be a minimally sufficient set, which is what is required
for causal efficacy. Conversely, if 0 's having G entails that 0 has F, we know
that G is not causally efficacious, for if it were, by the same reasoning as above,
then F would not be, and by stipulation, it is.
So, according to the Exclusion Principle, if a set of properties is causally
efficacious for a given effect, all properties which entail them and all properties
which are entailed by them are causally inert. 28 This implication seems counterintuitive. Consider the following propositions:
The cape has surface reflectance property R.
The cape is red21 .
The cape is crimson.
The cape is red.
The cape is colored. 29
Now, suppose that each proposition entails its successor. If one of the above
properties is causally efficacious for a certain effect, it follows that all of the
others are causally inert with respect to that effect. How do we decide which
property is the efficacious one? It is not clear how to answer, and this does
not seem to be just an epistemic problem. It is not clear what would determine
the level of specificity at which the causal action is going on. One might
assume that all of the causal action happens at the most fundamental level.
But what is the basis of that assumption? Such an assumption has serious
counter-intuitive consequences, for example, that all of the macro-properties
we regularly observe are causally impotent. Furthermore, assuming that all

28

29

Properly speaking, propositions about properties entail or are entailed.
This expands on a point made by Stephen Yablo, 'Mental Causation', p. 257.
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causal action happens at the level of fundamental properties may not serve the
Inert Dispositions View; it is not at all obvious that the fundamental properties
are wholly non-dispositional. Strawson, for example, claims:
It seems that our search for the properties of the categorical base

must finally lead us to the undeniably theoretical properties which
physics assigns to the ultimate constituents of matter - perhaps force,
mass, impenetrability, electric charge. But these properties seem to be
thoroughly dispositional in character... 30
The implausibility of the Exclusion Principle in practice may be better
illustrated by returning to the example of the scale. Recall that our scale will
tell you if your package is over 20 pounds, and your package is, in fact, 21
pounds. The scale indicates that the package is over the weight limit. Now,
what property of the package was causally efficacious for tipping the scale?
Was it the property of weighing 21 pounds, or the property of weighing over
20 pounds? If it was the property of weighing 21 pounds, does that mean that
the property of weighing over 20 pounds was causally impotent?
Intuitively, it seems not. Either weighing 21 pounds or weighing over 20
pounds could be causally efficacious. The causal efficacy of one property
does not preclude the other property from being causally efficacious as well.
Either could be a member of a minimally sufficient set of properties. The fact
that we already have a sufficient set of properties is not a sufficient reason for
declaring a property outside of this set inert.
The worry that we are going to end up with too many causally efficacious
properties is an unfounded one. We might want to limit the number of events
that we consider sufficient to cause a given effect. However, the drive to put a
cap on causally efficacious properties is unmotivated. This is especially true
when the properties in question have some logical or law-like connection.
There are many ways to describe an event, many properties of the event we
can cite, different levels of specificity that we can appeal to. Our choice of
descriptions, predicates, and details is detennined by epistemic and pragmatic
considerations, but they are no less legitimate or real for that.
In the preface to Supervenience and Mind, Kim writes
.. .I am now inclined to think that ontological schemes are by and large
optional, and that the main considerations that should govern the choice

'Reply to Evans' , in Philosophical Subjects, ed. Zak van Straaten (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1980), p. 280.
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of an ontology are those of utility, simplicity, elegance, and the like.
Concerning such questions as whether there 'really are' events (over
and beyond substances and their properties) ... it just seems wrongheaded to think that there are 'true' answers, answers that are true
because they correctly depict some pre-existing metaphysical order of
the world. I think that the heart of ontological inquiry is construction
rather than description. 31
This pragmatic or conventionalist approach to metaphysics is at odds with
clinging to the Exclusion Principle at all costs. The ontological picture of the
No Work Argument is one in which only one set of fundamental properties is,
in fact, causally efficacious for a particular event. All the rest are inert. We may
talk as if these other properties are causally efficacious, but this is not strictly
speaking so. If anything, they piggy-back on the really efficacious properties.
But if we are going to construct an ontology, why not construct one that makes
sense of our explanatory practices and deep commitments, such as the causal
efficacy of mental properties? Instead of the ontology of exclusion, we could
develop one of inclusion, allowing a plurality of adequate explanations, and
multiple, overlapping sets of properties, any of which are candidates for telling
the causal story.

X. Conclusion
As mentioned at the outset, the idea that dispositions are causally efficacious
is a background assumption of many of our explanatory practices, including
ordinary, day-to-day explanations, psychological explanations, and scientific
explanations. Perhaps it is even an assumption behind our conception of
ourselves as agents. Absent good arguments to the contrary, we should not
relinquish the view that dispositions are causally efficacious.
I have tried to show that we do not have good arguments to the contrary. The
Inert Dispositions View is supported primarily by Analyticity Arguments and No
Work Arguments, and both have significant weaknesses. Analyticity Arguments
fail because conceptual connections do not preclude causal connections, and
Hume's Principle is unsupported. No Work arguments employ two controversial
premises, the Distinctness Thesis, and the Exclusion Principle. If a disposition
is a disjunction of its causal bases, or if a disposition trope is a causal basis
trope, then the Distinctness Thesis is false. If, as I suspect, there is no privileged

31

Supervenience and Mind, p. ix.
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explanation nor any special set of properties which preclude all other properties
from playing a role in the causal story, then the Exclusion Principle is false.
Undermining our explanatory practices and our belief in mental causation
would require more powerful arguments than these.
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